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Abstract
American government takes the approach that highly competitive practices, such
as elections, are the best way to represent the will of voters. However, in an era of hyper-
partisanship and high negative out-party affect, it is worth examining the negative effects
that salient partisan competition has on people’s attitudes. Specifically, I find that when
partisans perceive elections to be “neck and neck” (i.e., partisan competition is salient),
they tolerate co-partisan electoral cheating while harshly enforcing rules when their opposing
political party engages in the same election cheating.
Using an original survey experiment, I investigate the effects of salient partisan competition
on people’s tolerance of election cheating and endorsement of political norms and values
of fairness. After manipulating salience of partisan competition, I measured participants’
tolerance of election cheating that fosters an electoral advantage to either (randomly assigned)
their in-party or out-party as well as measuring participants’ endorsement of democratic
values of fairness. Although partisans selectively tolerate election cheating depending on
which party benefits when partisan competition is not salient, I find that greater salience
of partisan competition increases participants’ tolerance of election cheating when their
their in-party stands to benefit and decreases participants’ tolerance of election cheating
when their their out-party stands to benefit. Conversely, I do not find that salience of
partisan competition affects people’s endorsement of political values of fairness despite this
differing effect of tolerance of cheating by party benefit.
I discuss these findings in the context of democratic government and the connection
to modern partisan animus. These results have important implications regarding democratic
health as partisans are not willing to apply democratic norms of fairness under competitive
circumstances. Last, I conclude with a discussion of democratic governmental structure
and how changes representative democracies could reduce partisan conflict and double
standards.
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Introduction
Political competition is an ever-present force in America. People are inescapably
bombarded with politically charged media messaging emphasizing a fierce battle partisan
groups. This media messaging seems increasingly partisan, and political campaigning is
beginning earlier and earlier every year. The mechanisms of American government itself
seem to place high value on political competition (Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 2008) Yet, American
politics scholars have long accepted this valuing of political competition, and the unfortunate
effects it has, because it is supposedly the best way to aggregate mass preferences and
represent citizens in government (Schattschneider, 1960).
But, focusing on political competition as the best way to represent citizens may
unintentionally affect citizens in democratically harmful ways such as lowering support for
democratic values of fairness and adherence to political rules. Currently, no studies have
examined the indirect effect of how political competition affects support for these founda-
tional values that democratic systems need to thrive. Depending on how severely political
competition affects democratic stability, political and democratic theorists may need to
reexamine the nominative role of political competition in issues of electoral representation.
In this study, I investigate the effect of partisan competition on partisans’ adherence
to political values and rules that underpin democracy. Using an experimental approach,
I manipulated the salience of partisan competition by presenting participants with either
a simulated news article about a competitive political election or a simulated news article
about a non-competitive political election of a co-partisan. Then, I measured participants’
tolerance of breaking political rules in scenarios of election cheating as well as measure
support for political values of fairness directly.
I find that high salience of partisan competition, compared to low salience of partisan
competition, increases participants’ tolerance of election cheating when their political in-
party stands electorally benefit and also decreases participants’ tolerance of election cheating
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when their political out-party stands to electorally benefit. Although participants’ tolerance
of cheating was affected by partisan competition, their support for democratic values of
fairness was not affected by salience of partisan competition. In the following sections, I
review literature relevant to partisan and group competition as well as democratic values
of fairness and adherence to political rules. As there appears to be little to no research
specifically on the salience of partisan competition, I connect the literature about district
competitiveness and group conflict theory to coherently frame this study. I also discuss the
literature of political values of fairness and adherence to rules that seems to have fallen
by the wayside in recent years and how it is still relevant to today’s political environment.
Then, I summarize the methodology and review analyses used in this study. Last, I conclude
with important implications for this study and how future research can address remaining
questions. Given that highly competitive elections increase people’s double-standard of
tolerance of cheating, generalized findings of these study have clear implications for how
democratic structure affects democratic stability.
Group Competition and Politics
Looking beyond the United States, it is clear there is no single way to design a democratic
government (Kaiser, 1997; Schmidt, 2002). The specific design of government, along with
choices made by political parties, set the values by which the mechanisms of government
represent their citizens (Rahat et al., 2008). The United States places the importance of
competition above other governmental values such as participation and representation
(Rahat et al., 2008). This emphasis on political competition as the norm or ideal state
of government permeates even political academic work. Although there are benefits to
valuing political competition above other potential values, the academic exploration of
drawbacks and consequences is underdeveloped. It is these under considered effects and
assumptions that are worth an investigation into the consequences of the U.S. placing high
value on political competition.
As referenced above, the focus on competition between political groups, namely
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political parties, has a long history of study in American politics. On a foundational level,
Downs’ (1957) median voter theorem approaches government decision making from the
assumption of political competition. He specially references that the actions of democratic
government are a function of both expected vote choice by voters and the strategy of the
opposition party or parties. It is this assumption, along with the competition by parties
for the median voter, that inherently links Downs’ (1957) model of democratic government
to the assumption of political competition.
It would be an understatement to write that Downs’ (1957) theory, which ties democratic
government and political competition together, has been enormously impactful in the field
of American politics. Classic works in public opinion (Converse, 1964; Zaller 1992) and
legislative politics (Cox & McCubbins, 2005; Poole & Rosenthal, 2000) all incorporate
Downs’ (1957) theory in one way or another. However, this theory that democracy and
political competition are tied together is not the only democratic theory to draw from.
Instead, Buchler (2005) advances a theory of political representation and district
non-competition. In his theoretical paper, Buchler (2005) compares models of competitive
elections, in which the electoral districts in a state are designed to be maximally competitive,
to models of non-competitive elections, in which the electoral districts in a state are designed
to be minimally competitive by clustering ideologically homogeneous people together.
Buchler (2005) finds that his non-competitive model outperforms his competitive model
on minimizing legislator deviation from district median voter preferences, maximizing
similarity between constituents and representatives, minimizing distance between the state’s
median voter and the legislatures’ median voter, and maximizing the similarity of the
distribution of preferences in the legislature to the distribution of preferences in the electorate.
Overall, Buchler (2005) makes a compelling argument that political competition, at
least at the state level, is not necessarily the best way to achieve important representative
goals. It is instead specifically designed non-competitive districts that maximize represen-
tation. However, Buchler’s (2005) method is entirely theoretical and suffers from several
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limitations (notably that ideologically similar people cannot always be drawn into the
same district). While his work is theoretical, other empirical works support the conclusion
of Buchler’s (2005) findings.
Reexamining Downs (1957) in the context of Gingrich Revolution in 1994, it is not
clear that his median voter theorem can reliably account for election outcomes. Under
normal assumptions of the median voter theorem, a shift towards more extreme preferences
should result in decreased support for those preferences (as this moves away from the preferences
the median voter desires). However, the Gingrich Revolution was the first in a series of
instances in which moving to a more extreme policy bundle actually increased support and
electoral success. Fiorina (1999) questions this relationship of support and policy centrism
and reflects on the possible explanations (some of which are Downs’ own theoretical nuances)
as to the apparent breakdown of the standard median voter theorem. Overall, Fiorina
(1999) theorized that new assumptions must be made or the median voter theorem altered
for Downs’ (1957) theory to explain mass election outcomes.
This is not to say that the median voter theorem always gets preference aggregation
wrong. Giving evidence to Buchler’s (2005) conclusion, Gerber and Lewis (2004) find a
unique relationship between the preferences of legislators and district homogeneity. Although
generally legislators’ preferences are not constrained by median voter preferences in their
congressional districts, legislators representing homogeneous districts do show constrained
preferences (Gerber & Lewis, 2004).
Using specially drawn majority-minority districts as a prominent example of homogeneous
districts, it is clear that the benefits of homogeneous districts extend beyond simply constraining
legislator preferences. Being in one of these specialized districts both increases knowledge
about constituents’ elected representative and contact with their elected representative
(Banducci, Donovan, & Karp, 2004). Further, the creation of majority-minority districts
increases turnout and people who would benefit from being in a homogeneous district even
prefer it over a non-homogeneous district (Barreto, Segura, & Woods, 2004; Tate, 2003).
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Contrary to these benefits of homogeneous majority-minority districts, there are
researchers who conclude that the creation of majority-minority districts hurts the ability
of the minority’s party to advance its goals in government (Cameron, Epstein, & O’Halloran,
1996; Lubin, 1999; Petrocik & Desposato, 1998). However, this appears to only be the
case in creating these homogeneous districts around constraints such as geography. Thus,
negative effects of creating a homogeneous district likely would not be a concern if it was
the goal of all parties to create homogeneous districts (Shotts, 2001). Overall, the use of
homogeneous districts created to minimize political competition has clear benefits for both
optimized representation and the people living in these districts.
Given the extent of research on political competition, it is clear that there is founda-
tional evidence supporting benefits of non-competitive practices. The general approach
of American government and American politics scholarship assumes that placing high
value on competitive practices is the best method for government to represent its citizens.
However, there are democratically good benefits to practices that place higher value on
alternative considerations to competition such as participation and representation.
Competition and Behavior
On a behavioral level, group competition has a long history of study in both political
science, psychology, and even other disciples. Realistic group conflict theory (Campbell,
1965; Sherif, 1966) explains the social structure that creates antagonistic behavior between
groups. In this theory, conflict is created when groups exist in a competitive structure over
conflicting group interests. Conflict over zero-sum resources also is a notable feature in
realistic group conflict theory and serves as an important catalyst for conflict. In these
settings, in-group identification is strengthened and various forms of out-group hostility
are increased (Maxwell-Smith et al., 2016).
Another broad theory, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), further
theorizes intergroup conflict. Tajfel and Turner (1979 & 1986) highlight one other important
aspects of group competition. They specify that competitive action can be taken on behalf
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of one’s group rather than solely for one’s own interest. This means that people do not
have to see direct benefit to themselves to engage in intergroup competitive action as long
as they see benefit to their group by engaging in this action.
Taken together, realistic group conflict theory and social identity theory paint an
almost perfect picture of how competitive elections contribute to intergroup conflict. Elections,
and further the political influence they represent, are zero sum competitions. People engage
in behavior, such as voting, campaigning, and donating money, on behalf of their political
group. People do not gain direct benefits from these actions, but instead do so to further
their political group’s agenda. Within this competitive structure, people become strongly
attached to their political party and dislike, or even loath, their opposing political party
(Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). This is more than idle theorizing
however, as salient group competition has been shown to have an effect on people’s affect,
behavior, and cognition (Holtz & Miller, 2001; Judd & Park, 1988; Sommer, 1995).
As will be discussed in the next section, political tolerance is an important component
of political fairness and respect for political rules that are foundational to democratic systems.
Group competition also affects tolerance of politically related out-groups. People’s positive
or negative attitudes towards immigrants are driven in part by the perceived economic
threat immigrants pose (Jackson & Esses, 2000). Further, for some groups of people, such
as those high in Social Dominance Orientation, negative attitudes towards out-groups is
specifically mediated by degree of competitiveness felt towards that out-group (Duckitt,
2006). Although attitudes are certainly an important component of political life, it is behavior
instead that has the most potential consequences for democratic systems.
The finding about group competition most influential on this current study is about
the effect of salient group competition on adherence to rules. Using an experimental approach,
Hildreth, Gino, and Bazerman (2015) examined how manipulating salient group competition
affected people’s self-reported performance on a number-based puzzle. When group competition
was made salient, participants with high levels of in-group identification and loyalty self-
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reported better performance on their puzzle task than their actual performance.
Further research has yet to investigate this finding outside of the laboratory and
about political groups such as political parties and their partisans. In a political context,
the implications of this finding about selective adherence to rules could be extremely consequential
to democratic government. Combined with other broad theories regarding group conflict,
partisan competition has the capacity to encourage Democrats and Republicans to win
resources (e.g., influence though elections) for their group at any cost including disregarding
rules and principles of fairness. As support for political values of fairness and adherence to
rules is a cornerstone of democracy, an influence that undermines this support requires
further study. In the following section, I review how consequential support these political
values are.
Political Values of Fairness and Respect for Rules
Even from the first studies of democratic systems, the values of fairness and respect
for rules and norms these systems possess were theorized to be an integral part of a democratic
system. De Tocqueville (1840, translation 2003) wrote that it was the customs and attitudes
of the American people towards democracy that made the American democratic system
possible. Specifically, he thought that too many other political theorists put their faith in
rule of law alone and discounted the importance of the mass attitudes that contributed to
democratic stability.
Over a century later, political science gained interest in exploring the connection
between democracy and cultural values of fairness and respect for rules. Griffith, Plamenatz,
and Pennock (1956) specifically identified “respect for rules and procedures” as a cornerstone
of cultural beliefs necessary for successful democracy. Further, they claimed that democracies
that lack the respect for rules and procedures must create further “procedural restraints”
to safeguard democracy.
As one of the first researchers to empirically measure support for these fundamental
democratic values, McClosky (1964) examined popular and elite support for these values
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by asking people questions about minority rights, due process, and freedom of speech.
These “rules of the game” questions measured support for core democratic values. The
willingness to violate these values was comparatively large for most people with an average
of 32.8% of the general electorate endorsing items that violated these democratic values.
For the purposes of comparison, only an average of 21.1% of elites endorsed the same democratic
value violating questions. Although this is not an overwhelming amount of people who are
willing endorse breaking values of fairness and political rules and norms, almost one third
of the general electorate supporting these items is not something to casually dismiss. After
all, more recent scholars support both de Tocqueville’s theory regarding the importance of
these values to democracy and McClosky’s findings about the general endorsement of these
values.
A contemporary review of the literature on political values of fairness and adherence
to rules supports conclusions that these values are important to democracy and that support
for them is not universal. Sullivan and Transue (1999) report that McClosky’s (1964) findings
were replicated by other studies. More importantly, these findings furthered the theoretical
development of the importance of rules and norms to democratic systems. Political elites,
who have higher levels of these democratic values, can safeguard democracy from the citizens
who lack or do not understand these values (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). This does not
mean that mass public’s support for these values is irrelevant. In examining both Russia’s
and South Africa’s democratic development, Gibson (1996) concluded that political norms
of tolerance are crucially connected to the development of proper democratic systems.
Overall, public support for a set of important democratic values about fairness and respect
for rules is directly linked to health and continuation of a successful democracy.
Hypotheses
In this study, I investigate possible consequences of salient partisan competition.
First, I examine the political generalizability of Hildreth et al. (2015) by seeing the effect
of salient partisan competition on questions regarding participant tolerance of rule breaking
PARTISAN CHEATING & COMPETING 12
in fictional electoral situations. Elections are the most directly applicable political zero-
sum contest in which rules can be broken (e.g., voter fraud) or followed (e.g., strict ID
requirements to vote that disadvantage a group) to provide an direct advantage in an
electoral contest. Therefore, I use a series of questions about fictional instances of electoral
cheating to examine how salience of partisan competition affects equal tolerance of cheating
depending on what group would benefit from rule breaking. Specifically, I examine how
likely people are to tolerate election cheating that would benefit an in-group or out-group
when partisan competition is salient and when partisan competition is not salient.
In line with other general findings about in-group favoritism and partisan in-party
preferences, I expect people to exhibit a partisan “double standard” on their tolerance of
cheating depending on which political party benefits from said cheating.
Hypothesis 1 : People will tolerate election cheating more when it benefits their in-
party, compared to when it benefits the out-party.
I also expect salience of partisan competition to affect people’s tolerance of electoral cheating
in partisan motivated directions. With partisan competition salient, I expect people’s
tolerance of electoral cheating to change based on what benefits their in-party and harms
their out-party. Further, I expect an interactive effect of salience of partisan competition
and whether people’s in-party or out-party benefits from electoral cheating on people’s
tolerance of electoral cheating. Salient partisan completion should increase the difference
between people’s tolerance of electoral cheating depending on whether their in-party or
out-party benefits from electoral cheating.
Hypothesis 2a: When partisan competition is salient, compared to when partisan
competition is not salient, people will tolerate election cheating more when it benefits
their in-party and will tolerate election cheating less when it benefits their out-party.
Hypothesis 2b: Salient partisan competition will magnify the difference in tolerance
of election cheating when the in-party benefits compared to when the out-party
benefits.
Last, I also examine the effect of salient partisan competition on people’s support
PARTISAN CHEATING & COMPETING 13
for political values of fairness and respect for rules. Similar to how message framing can
undermine or support political tolerance (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997), salient political
competition could affect people’s endorsement of political values that underpin democratic
systems.
Hypothesis 3 : Salient partisan competition will reduce support for political values of
fairness and respect for political rules.
Method
Participants
For this study, I recruited 653 participants from Lucid Theorem during January-
February 2020 and October-November 2020. This sample included more participants who
identified as a Democrat (339) than participants who identified as a Republican (253).
For Democratic participants, 54.3% reported they were strong Democrats, 23.3% reported
they were not very strong Democrats, and 22.4% reported they were independents but
considered themselves closer to the Democratic party. For Republican participants, 51.8%
reported they were strong Republicans, 28.1% reported they were not very strong Republican,
and 20.1% reported they were independents but considered themselves closer towards the
Republican party. The remaining participants (61) did not identify as either a Democrat
or Republican. Participants who identified as political independents are not included in
analysis that focuses on political group membership as they do not fit into a clear political
group, and do not have a clear political out-group, in the same way as Democrats and
Republicans.
The median participant age was 49 with ages ranging from 18 years old to 95 years
old and a standard deviation of 16.8 years. Most participants self-identified as only White
(81.6%) with the next largest racial/ethic groups being Black or African American (9.8%)
and Hispanic or Latino (3.4%). Most participants were female (54.5%). The modal participant
education level was obtaining a Bachelor’s degree (25.4%) with the next most frequent
PARTISAN CHEATING & COMPETING 14
education levels being attending some college but no degree (23.3%) and having a high
school diploma or equivalent (17.0%). The modal participant family household income per
year category was between $20,001-40,000 (23.9%) with the next most frequent income
categories being $40,001-60,000 per year (16.2%) and $0-20,000 per year (14.7%). Most
participants reported owning their current place of residence (65.1%), many reported renting
their current place of residence (29.6%), and a minority reported other circumstances regarding
their place of residence (4.7%). All participants were from the United States.
Although a sample from Lucid is not a truly random sample, participants recruited
by Lucid are adequately representative of the general population and are more represen-
tative than other common sources of convenient samples such as college students (Buhrmester,
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; Coppock & McClellan, 2019;
Hauser & Schwarz, 2016). Participants recruited from Lucid are slightly more educated
than the U.S. overall (by a mean of 0.7 years of education), more White than the U.S
average, are slightly younger than the U.S. average, have slightly higher levels of political
interest than representative samples of the U.S., and are less extroverted than represen-
tative samples of the U.S. (Coppock & McClellan, 2019). However, Participants recruited
from Lucid are generally more socio-economically and racially/ethnically diverse than
college samples and other common internet samples (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Casler et al.,
2013; Coppock & McClellan, 2019). Further, the Lucid sample pool does not significantly
differ from the U.S. population at large in terms of mean income, sex, geographical region
of the U.S., political party identification, voter registration, several personality character-
istics, and more (Coppock & McClellan, 2019). Last, participants recruited from online
platforms such as Lucid are more attentive to online survey than than participants from
traditional convenient sampling pools (Casler et al., 2013; Hauser & Schwarz, 2016).
Procedure
Participants were first asked about their political party affiliation, their political
ideology, and were given a series of distractor questions with two embedded attention screening
PARTISAN CHEATING & COMPETING 15
questions. For political party affiliation, participants were presented with two branching
questions. They were first asked if they identified as a Democrat, a Republican, or an
independent/other. Then partisan participants were asked how strongly they considered
themselves a member of that partisan group and independent participants were asked if
thought of themselves as being closer to one political party or to neither political party.
For self-identified political ideology, participants were asked to rate themselves separately
on social issues and economic issues. participants were asked to place themselves using
a 7-point scale ranging from extremely conservative to extremely liberal with a moderate
midpoint options and additional haven’t thought about it response option. For analyses,
these two questions were averaged in to a single ideology scale. For the attention check
questions, one attention screening question asked participants to pick a certain news source
out of a list instead of responding with which news sources they reliably used (Berinsky,
Margolis, & Sances, 2014). The other question asked participants their attitudes on U.S.
rail infrastructure and participants were informed to respond that the U.S. government
should use eminent domain to size necessary land. Participants who failed either attention
screening questions were not used in this study.
Then, participants were randomly assigned to either the competitive group or the
non-competitive group. Participants were asked to read an excerpt from a (fictional) newspaper’s
online article. Participants in the competitive group read an article designed to prime
partisan competition (i.e., competition prime). This article stated how important the 2020
U.S. House of Representatives elections will be. This article also gave an example of the
competitiveness of the 2020 House elections by highlighting a political candidate of the
participants’ own party in an election that is predicted to be contentious and consequential.
This article was tailored to participants’ political affiliation, so Democrat and Republican
participants received slightly different articles. Independent participants randomly received
either a Democrat or Republican tailored article.
Participants in the non-competitive group read a similar article designed to prime
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non-competition (i.e., non-competition prime). This article stated that Americans are not
divided on political issues and tend to agree about most political topics. This article also
gave an example by highlighting a political candidate of the participants’ own party in a
non-competitive (i.e., safe) 2020 House election and explaining that constituents like and
approve of this representative. Like the article for the competitive group, this article was
tailored to participants’ political affiliation. Images of the competition primes and non-
competition primes can be found in the appendix.
In a literature review, Maxwell-Smith et al. (2016) supports the effectiveness of similar
primes of group competition. They conclude that group competitive behavior is both a
trait and state that can be experimentally manipulated. Overall, researchers find that
these two types primes induced states of competitive processing and non-competitive processing.
As will be discussed in my Results section, my primes did induce differences in perceptions
of political competitiveness.
After reading the partisan competition prime or non-competition prime, participants
answered two questions designed to determine their perception of partisan competition.
The first question asked participants about how competitive they believe U.S. Congres-
sional elections are on a 6-point Likert-type scale with response options ranging from not
competitive to extremely competitive. The second question asked participants about important
it is to them that their political party wins the 2020 election also on a 6-point Likert-type
scale with response options ranging from not important to extremely important. Independent
participants were randomly presented with either the Democrat or Republican version of
this question.
Next, participants answered two sets of questions designed to measure their willingness
to tolerate election cheating to the benefit of their in-party/out-party and support for
political values of fairness. For questions about election cheating, participants were randomly
assigned to answer these five questions focused on members of their political in-party (e.g.,
Democrats answering questions about other Democrats) or members of their political out-
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party (e.g., Democrats answering questions about Republicans). All participants were
presented with the same set of questions measuring their support for political values of
fairness and respect for rules.
In the set of election cheating questions, participants were given a series of five Likert-
type questions asking how participants would response to fictional scenarios about the
2020 election. All question response options were anchored with support for following the
law on one end and agreement with breaking the law to the electoral benefit of their in-
party/out-party (randomly assigned) on the other end of the scale. The topics of these
novel questions were if participants would report an in-party/out-party acquaintance to
election officials for committing voter fraud, voting for an in-party/out-party politician
who attempted to misinform out-party/in-party voters about the date of an election, allowing
a majority in-party/out-party county to count votes places after a state mandated cut
off time, turning away an in-party/out-party acquaintance from a polling place for lack
of appropriate voter ID, and voting using a friend’s voter registration. Participants could
respond to these questions with a 7-point scale that included a midpoint option. The full
text of these questions can be found in the appendix.
The second set of questions about political values of fairness and respect for rules
were the twelve “rules of the game” questions by McClosky (1964). These twelve items are
designed to measure participants’ belief in “fundamental values” and belief in procedural
rules of democratic government. This scale includes items such as “the majority has the
right to abolish the minorities if it wants to” and “politicians have to cut a few corners if
they are going to get anywhere”. Participants could respond to each question with a 7-
point scale with responses ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree with a midpoint
option.
Participants also completed a five-item political knowledge scale. Some of these questions
were standard civics type questions such as “Whose responsibility is it to determine if a
law is constitutional or not? Is it the President, the Congress, or the Supreme Court?”
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Other political knowledge questions were focused on currents events and international
political knowledge such as “Xi Jinping is currently the political leader of which country?”
Participants were given four multiple choice response options to choose from (with the
exception of two questions with Democrats and Republicans response options) plus a don’t
know option. From these items, I created a political knowledge scale with possible scores
ranging from 0 (no questions correct) to 5 (all questions correct). The average political
knowledge score was 2.98 with a standard deviation of 1.57.
Last, participants completed several standard demographics questions. These questions
included self-reporting age, sex, and belonging to self-identified racial groups. Participants
also self-reported their highest level of education from several categories, their household
level of income, and whether they rented or owned their current place of residence. Then,




As intended, my experimental treatments caused a significant difference in partic-
ipants’ perceptions of how competitive U.S. elections are but did not cause a significant
difference in participants’ importance that their political party wins elections. Partic-
ipants who received the partisan competition prime’s perception of competitiveness in U.S.
Congressional elections (M = 3.72, SD = 1.12) was significantly greater than participants
who received the non-competition prime’s perception of competitiveness in U.S. Congres-
sional elections (M = 2.96, SD = 1.40), t(586.85) = −7.51, p < .001, d = −0.59, 95% CI
[−0.95, −0.56]. However, there was not a significant difference between partisans’ belief
that winning the 2020 election was important between those who received the partisan
competition prime (M = 4.79, SD = 1.64) and those who received the non-competition
prime (M = 4.66, SD = 1.73), t(570.05) = −0.93, p = .353, d = −0.08, 95% CI [−0.40,
PARTISAN CHEATING & COMPETING 19
0.14].
Tolerance of Election Cheating
To analyze participants’ responses about the five electoral cheating questions, I conducted
a series of difference in mean tests and linear regressions. For these analyses, I collapsed
the group that would benefit from cheating for each question across political affiliations
into in-party (e.g., Democrats being asked about other Democrats) and out-party (e.g,
Democrats being asked about Republicans). Then, item responses were added into a linear
scale with low scores indicating support for following the law and high scores indicating
agreement with breaking the law to benefit a participant’s in-party/out-party.
As these five electoral cheating questions are novel, and thus have yet to be validated,
I conducted a series of Cronbach’s alpha reliability analyses. In ideal circumstances, the
reliability of this scale would have been tested on a separate sample of participants who
received no experimental manipulation and who responded to other questions to determine
convergent and discriminant validity. Unfortunately, this was not feasible given resource
limitations and this present study being focused on experimental effects rather than scale
creation. To be as conservative as possible in testing the underlying construct of an additive
scale comprised of these items, I conducted these reliability analyses independently for
the four possible combination of group target (i.e., in-party would benefit from electoral
cheating and out-party would benefit from electoral cheating) and type of treatment received
(i.e., partisan competition prime and non-competition prime).
All four initial reliability analyses indicated that the Cronbach’s alpha would be
improved by dropping electoral cheating question three (i.e., willingness to count votes
cast on election day past cut-off time in heavily partisan county). These initial reliability
analyses are found in Table 7 and Table 8 located in the appendix. The reliability analyses
for the remaining four items is located in Table 1 for the in-party would benefit from cheating
items and Table 2 for the out-party would benefit from cheating items.
Three conclusion from these reliability analysis are clear. First, the alpha levels indicate
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Table 1: Conbach’s Alpha Scores for Election Cheating In-party Target Questions
Non-Competition Prime Partisan Competition Prime
Item Statistics: Reliability if Dropped: Item Statistics: Reliability if Dropped:
Raw α Standardized α Raw α Standardized α Raw α Standardized α Raw α test
EC1 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.41 0.41 0.59 0.57
EC2 0.66 0.67 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.43 0.42
EC4 0.75 0.75 0.45 0.46 0.79 0.77 0.05 0.06
EC5 0.70 0.70 0.52 0.52 0.71 0.69 0.22 0.22
Raw α 0.61 0.43
Standardized α 0.61 0.42
Observations 128 153
Table 2: Conbach’s Alpha Scores for Election Cheating Out-party Target Questions
Non-Competition Prime Partisan Competition Prime
Item Statistics: Reliability if Dropped: Item Statistics: Reliability if Dropped:
Raw α Standardized α Raw α Standardized α Raw α Standardized α Raw α test
EC1 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.58 0.56 0.26 0.24
EC2 0.41 0.51 0.41 0.41 0.35 0.43 0.42 0.42
EC4 0.72 0.70 0.11 0.11 0.67 0.65 0.11 0.09
EC5 0.71 0.66 0.16 0.18 0.62 0.41 0.16 0.14
Raw α 0.38 0.31
Standardized α 0.37 0.29
Observations 149 162
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acceptable levels of internal consistency given scale constraints. Conbach’s alpha coeffi-
cients are biased towards being smaller the fewer number of items a scale is comprised
of (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). So although the alpha for the in-party questions (α = .61)
would be classified as questionable under ideal circumstances, with only four items in this
scale this is an acceptable alpha. Likewise, the alpha for the out-party questions (α = .38)
would be classified as poor or unacceptable under ideal circumstances but in this scale is
at least questionable or acceptable (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). While this is less than ideal for
out-party electoral cheating questions, these items should have enough internal consistency
to be used in analyses. The difference in internal consistency between the in-party and
out-party electoral cheating is the subject of my next conclusion.
Second, the Cronbach’s alpha scores are substantially lower for the out-party would
benefit from cheating items compared to the in-party would benefit from cheating items.
With a difference in raw alpha scores of over .2, the in-party questions, compared to the
out-party questions, have statistically significantly more internal consistency (F (127,148)
= 1.590, p = .007) (Diedenhofen, 2016). However there is not a statistically significant
difference between the alpha coefficients based on group target for participants who received
the partisan competition prime (F (152,161) = 1.211, p = .232) (Diedenhofen, 2016). Therefore,
I conclude that the electoral cheating questions make a more consistent scale when used
for participants choosing between benefiting their in-party by rule breaking or following
rules compared to using identical questions for participants choosing between benefiting
their out-party by rule breaking or following rules. This present study does not have the
capacity though convergent and discriminate validity to delve in to why this difference
exists but future research could seek to answer this question. For the purpose of this present
study, I conclude that, while there is adequate reliability for both in-party and out-party
electoral cheating questions, I can be more confident in the validity of results using the in-
party would benefit from cheating items compared to the validity of results using the out-
party would benefit from cheating items. These results include treatment effects, which I
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next turn to in regards to differences in scale reliability.
Third, the Cronbach’s alpha scores for items when participants received the partisan
competition prime, compared to those who received the non-competition prime, is lower.
This difference is only statistically significant for the in-party would benefit from cheating
items (F (127,152) = 1.462, p = .025) and not statistically significant for the out-party
would benefit from cheating items (F (148,161) = 1.113, p = .506) (Diedenhofen, 2016).
These differences are confounded by, and possibly a result of, the differences in primes
participants receive. For this reason, I do not believe any differences between these two
group is problematic for the validity of any statistical inferences. While the statistically
significant difference for the in-party items by primes but not the out-party items by prime
indicates something, this could be a stronger treatment effect for in-party items (i.e., in
which the treatment effects the four items in unequal ways thus reducing the alpha) than
the out-party items. Alternatively, the treatment effect of priming partisan competition
could be more equal across out-party items compared to an unequal treatment effect across
in-party items. Further, this difference could even be the result of a floor effect as the
alpha for the in-party items has more “room” to decrease compared to the alpha for the
out-party items. The exact meaning of the differences in alpha coefficients by prime is
unclear, but confounding by the treatments themselves indicates no substantial problems
for causal analyses using treatment effects.
Therefore, the final electoral cheating scale using in this analysis is comprised of
four Likert-type items each with a 7-point response scale. The electoral cheating scale
scores range from the lowest possible score of 0 (i.e., maximum disagreement with election
cheating to benefit in-party/out-party in every individual item) to the highest possible
score of 24 (i.e., maximum agreement with election cheating to benefit in-party/out-party
in every individual item). All analyses on individual question items also follow these endpoints.
To analyze the effects of of priming partisan competition and party that would benefit
from cheating on tolerance of election cheating, I conducted two linear regression which
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are reported in Table 3. I first conducted a “restricted model” which only contained the
dummy variables for receiving the partisan competition prime, having the out-party benefit
from electoral cheating in the electoral cheating questions, and the interaction of these two
variables. Then, I conducted a “full model” which contained several covariates in addition
to the dummy variables from the restricted model. Of these covariates, political knowledge
measures participants’ total amount of correct answers to the 5-item political knowledge
scale. Political ideological extremity measures participants’ self-identified political ideology
with 0 being moderate and 3 being extremely conservative/liberal (i.e., a Democrat with a
positive score indicates she/he identified as a liberal whereas a Republican with a positive
score indicates she/he identified as a conservative). Male and non-White are both dummy
demographic variables indicating self-identified status as either a male or a non-White
racial/ethic group. Although the full model, compared to the restricted model, does statis-
tically significantly account for more variance of the electoral cheating scale according to a
model comparison ANOVA (F (6) = 3.7341, p = .001), the substantive difference is small
with a residual sum of squares decrease of 3.8% (restricted model RSS is 12050, compared
to the full model RSS of 11589).
In both models, I find substantive and interpretative effects for priming partisan
competition, the party that would benefit from cheating, and the interaction of these dummy
variables. To further explain the comparisons between these groups, I conducted a series
of regression contrasts for the restricted and full models as seen in Table 4. This series
of contrasts compares the relevant comparisons of if participants received the partisan
competition prime or the non-competition prime and if participants answers the electoral
cheating questions about their in-party benefiting from cheating and about their out-party
benefiting from cheating. As the differences between these two contrast analyses is slight
(in the full model, the difference between partisan competition prime and out-party target
& non-competition prime and out-party target changes from statically significant at the
0.95 level to marginally significant), I focus my analysis on the contracts of the restricted
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Table 3: Electoral Cheating Regression Models
Dependent variable: Electoral Cheating Scale
Restricted Model Full Model
Constant 7.672∗∗ 7.216∗∗
(0.408) (0.610)
Partisan Competition Prime 1.354∗ 1.293∗
(0.553) (0.556)
Out-Party Benefit from Cheating −2.115∗∗ −1.599∗∗
(0.556) (0.605)
Partisan Competition Prime* −2.424∗∗ −2.209∗∗
Out-Party Benefit from Cheating (0.762) (0.766)
Political Knowledge −0.083
(0.125)
Political Ideological Extremity 0.196
(0.171)
Political Ideological Extremity* −0.552∗









Adjusted R2 0.129 0.147
Residual Std. Error 4.616 (df = 588) 4.533 (df = 564)
F Statistic 30.229∗∗ (df = 3; 588) 11.962∗∗ (df = 9; 564)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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model for sake of parsimony. These contrasts are visualized by plotting the estimated
marginal means in Figure 1 (Figure 7, which plots the estimated marginal means of the
full model, can be found in the Appendix).
Table 4: Electoral Cheating Regression Contrasts
Restricted Model Full Model
Contrast Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Non-Competition Prime In-party & 2.11∗∗ 3.802 2.176∗∗ 3.885
Non-Competition Prime Out-party (0.556) (0.560)
Partisan Competition Prime In-party & 4.54∗∗ 8.721 4.385∗∗ 8.447
Partisan Competition Prime Out-party (0.520) (0.519)
Partisan Competition Prime In-party & 1.35∗ 2.449 1.293∗ 2.326
Non-Competition Prime In-party (0.553) (0.556)
Partisan Competition Prime Out-party & -1.07∗ -2.041 -0.916† -1.740
Non-Competition Prime Out-party (0.524) (0.527)
df 588 564
Result averages: Results are averaged
over the levels of:
Male, Non-White
P value adjustment:
Benjamini-Hochberg method for 4 tests
Note: †p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
To examine the differences between the possible combinations of partisan competition
prime/non-competition prime and in-party would benefit from cheating/out-party would
benefit from cheating, Table 4 and Figure 1 report the differences and means of partic-
ipants’ tolerance of election cheating. As a starting point of analysis, there is a statically
significant difference between participants’ tolerance of election cheating depending on
whether their in-party would benefit from cheating or their out-party would benefit from
cheating. When their in-party would benefit from election cheating, compared to when
their out-party would benefit from election cheating, participants were more willing to
tolerate election cheating. This effect size is equal to a difference of just over two scale
response points total (Ψ = 2.11, p < .001) or an effect size of 42.7% of a standard deviation.
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Beyond just these difference by which party benefits from election cheating, there are further
differences depending on the salience of partisan competition.
Priming partisan competition also has a statistically significant effect on tolerance of
election cheating. This effect of salient partisan competition changed participants’ tolerance
of election cheating in partisan motivated directions. When their in-party would benefit
from election cheating, participants who were primed with partisan competition, compared
to those who were primed with non-competition, were more willing to tolerate election
cheating. This effect size is equal to an increase of less than one and half scale response
points (Ψ = 1.35, p = .029) or an effect size of 26.4% of a standard deviation of the in-
party would benefit from cheating electoral cheating scale. Conversely, when their out-
party would benefit from election cheating, participants who were primed with partisan
competition, compared to those who were primed with non-competition, were less willing
to tolerate election cheating. This effect size is equal to a decrease of about one scale response
point (Ψ = −1.07, p = .042) or an effect size of 25.6% of a standard deviation of the out-
party would benefit from cheating electoral cheating scale. Taken together, these effects of
salient partisan competition exaggerate the difference between how participants responded
to election cheating questions depending on which party benefited from cheating.
When primed with partisan competition, there is a statistically significant difference
between participants’ tolerance of election cheating between when their in-party would
benefit from cheating and when their out-party would benefit from cheating. When their
in-party would benefit from electoral cheating while primed with partisan competition,
compared to when their out-party would benefit from electoral cheating while primed with
partisan competition, participants were more willing to tolerate election cheating. This
effect size is equal to a difference of four and a half scale response points total (Ψ = 4.54,
p < .001) or an effect size of 91.8% of a standard deviation.
As Figure 1 illustrates, it is the interactive effect of salient partisan competition and
group that would benefit from election cheating that is most distinctive on participants’
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tolerance of election cheating. Although the treatment effects from priming partisan competition
are substantively small when compared within the same grouping of party that would
benefit from electoral cheating, these individual treatment effects have opposing directional
results. It is the large difference between how participants primed with partisan competition
tolerate election cheating depending on whether it benefits their in-party or out-party,
compared to the more modest difference of tolerance of election cheating based on party
benefit when participants are primed with non-competition, that has the largest substantive
difference of all analyzed comparisons.
Figure 1: Effect of Priming Competition & Group Target on Tolerance of Election
Cheating
Beyond the experimentally manipulated effects on participants’ tolerance of election
cheating, my full model (Table 3) includes relevant covariates. Of these covariates, participant
self-identified political ideology has a statistically significant conditional effect. Although
ideology does not affect how participants tolerate election cheating when their in-party
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would benefit from cheating (β = 0.196, p = .252), it does affect how participants tolerate
election cheating when their out-party would benefit from cheating (β = −0.552, p = .019).
When their out-party would benefit from election cheating, participants become less tolerant
of election cheating for every move towards identifying as an extreme conservative/liberal
(when the participant correspondingly identifies as a Republican/Democrat). This means
that an Democrat who identifies as extremely liberal compared to a Democrat who identifies
as a moderate is about one and a half scale response points less tolerant of election cheating
on the 4-item election cheating scale. Non-White men, compared to White women, are
statistically significantly more willing to tolerate election cheating. This effect is equal
to a difference of almost two scale response points (β = 1.981, p = .046) among the 4-
item scale. In contrast to this demographic effect, neither being a man (compared to a
woman) nor self-identifying as belonging to a non-White racial group (compared to self-
identifying as White) had a significant effect on participants’ tolerance of election cheating
(β = 0.548, p = .200; β = 0.407, p = .538). Last, participants’ level of political knowledge,
as measured by the number of correct responses to the five-item political knowledge scale,
did not have a significant effect on participants’ tolerance of election cheating (β = −0.083,
p = .509).
Overall, in both restricted and full models the interactive effect of priming partisan
competition and the target of group benefit from election cheating has most significant
and substantively largest effect on participants’ tolerance of election cheating. Although
the treatment effect of priming partisan competition within the same target group of cheating
benefit is statistically significantly but modest in size, the most substantive effect of priming
partisan competition lies in the difference between how participants tolerate election cheating
depending on which party benefits from election cheating while primed with partisan competition.
Although there are some covariates that have significant effects participants’ tolerance
of election cheating, these effect sizes are no larger than the effect of priming partisan
competition.
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Exploratory Analyses: Differences in Tolerance of Election Cheating by Partisanship
In my main analysis of tolerance of electoral cheating, I collapse across partisanship
to increase my statiscial power. However, this approach can obscure differences of how
Democrats and Republicans are affected by the experimental effects of this study. To explore
these potential differences by partisanship, I conducted linear regression models for only
Democrat participants and Republican participants with my restricted model specifications
(i.e., the dummy variables indicate receiving the partisan competition prime, having the
out-party benefit from election cheating in the electoral cheating questions, and the interaction
of these two variables) in order to keep statiscial power as large as possible. As the regression
contracts are the focus of this analysis, the linear regression results can be found in Table
9 located in the appendix. As the following paragraph specifies, there are distinct differences
in experimental effects by partisanship.
Table 5: Election Cheating Regression Contrasts by Partisanship
Democratic Participants Only Republican Participants Only
Contrast Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Non-Competition Prime In-party & 1.958∗ 2.651 2.416∗ 2.944
Non-Competition Prime Out-party (0.739) (0.821)
Partisan Competition Prime In-party & 4.909∗∗ 6.742 3.988∗∗ 5.578
Partisan Competition Prime Out-party (0.728) (0.715)
Partisan Competition Prime In-party & 2.301∗∗ 3.051 0.198 0.253
Non-Competition Prime In-party (0.754) (0.785)
Partisan Competition Prime Out-party & -0.649 -0.912 -1.373 -1.821
Non-Competition Prime Out-party (0.712) (0.754)
df 335 249
P value adjustment:
Benjamini-Hochberg method for 4 tests
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
In my exploratory analysis, I find differing experimental effects by partisanship. The
regression contracts of the restricted models by partisanship are located in Table 5. These
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Figure 2: Effect of Priming Competition & Group Target on Tolerance of Election
Cheating by Partisanship
contracts are visualized in Figure 2. For Democratic participants, there are noticeable
differences from the all partisans regression contrasts results. Compared to the all partisan
model, the differences between tolerance of election cheating depending on which group
benefits from cheating for both the participants who received the non-competition prime
and the partisan competition prime remain about equal (less than half a response point of
change). However, this difference is due to the statistically significant increase in tolerance
of election cheating when Democrats would benefit while primed with partisan competition
compared to when prime with non-competition (Ψ = 2.301, p = .007) rather than to two
significant opposing effects. There is not a significant difference of tolerance of election
cheating when primed with partisan competition, compared to when prime with non-competition,
for instances in which Republicans would benefit from election cheating (Ψ = −0.649, p =
.363). These analyses about Democratic participants are contrasted by the findings from
Republican participants.
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For Republican participants, there are again noticeable differences from the all partisans
regression contrasts results. Similar to the Democratic participants model, there is little
difference between the Republican participant model and all partisans model for differences
between tolerance of election cheating depending on which group benefits from cheating
across the participants non-competition prime and participants who received the partisan
competition prime. Although the differences between the Republican and all partisans
model is slightly larger than the differences between the Democratic and all partisans
model (slightly more than half a response point of change), the differences are comparable
within target group of benefit. However, this difference is due to the decrease in tolerance
of election cheating when Democrats would benefit while primed with partisan competition
compared to when prime with non-competition (Ψ = −1.373, p = .140) rather than to
two opposing effects. Although this effect does not reach the traditional level of statistical
significance, this is likely a result of small sample size (n = 253, split between four groups)
compared to Democratic (n = 339) results or all partisan results (n = 588). With a larger
sample that follows the same distribution among groups, this difference would likely reach
at least marginal levels of statistical significance. This is compared to the starkly non-
significant difference of tolerance of election cheating when primed with partisan competition,
compared to when prime with non-competition, for instances in which Republicans would
benefit from election cheating (Ψ = 0.198, p = .801). Together with the contrast results
of Democratic participants, these contrast results of Republican participants show how
partisans’ tolerance of election cheating are affected by the experimental treatments differently.
Overall, Democrats and Republicans appear to be inversely sensitive to salient partisan
competition depending on whether their in-party or out-party benefits from election cheating.
For Democrats, priming partisan competition increases their tolerance of election cheating
only when Democrats (i.e., their in-party) benefit from cheating. And although the relationship
is not as clear due to low statistical power, for Republicans, priming partisan competition
decreases their tolerance of election cheating only when Democrats (i.e., their out-party)
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benefit from cheating. While these partisan differences are preliminary findings based
on comparatively low sample sizes, these analyses can serve as a starting point for future
research and validation.
Political Values of Fairness and Respect for Rules/Rules of the Game Scale
To analyze participants’ responses about the twelve ”Rules of the Game” questions,
and thus to their support for political values of fairness and respect for rules, I again conducted
a linear regression model. I combined all twelve questions into an additive scale with possible
scores ranging from 0 (strongly disagreeing with breaking political values of fairness and
respecting political rules) to 72 (strongly agreeing with breaking political values of fairness
and not respecting rules). I do not find a significant effect of priming partisan competition
on participants’ support for political values of fairness in this model. I do find significant
effects of several covariates on participants’ support for political values of fairness. The
covariates used in this model are identical to those used in the electoral cheating full model.
In my linear regression model, seen in Table 6, I do not find a significant difference
in response to the Rules of the Game scale for participants who received the partisan competition
prime compared to the participants who received the non-competition prime (F (6,566)=
8.506, p < .001; β = 0.568, p = 0.592). However, several covaraites had significant effects
on participants’ support for political values and respect for rules. Most notably Political
knowledge has a statistically significant negative effect on people’s support for breaking
political values of fairness (β = −1.706, p < .001). This effect is a decrease of over one and
a half scale response points per correct response to the five-item political knowledge scale
on the Rules of the Game scale. Next, political ideological extremity also has a statis-
tically significant negative effect on people’s support for breaking values of fairness (β =
−0.810, p = .013). This effect is a decrease of about three-quarters of a scale response
point for every move towards identifying as an extreme conservative/liberal. White men,
compared to White women, had a higher support for breaking political values of fairness
by over four scale response points (β = 4.318, p < .001). Both non-White women and non-
PARTISAN CHEATING & COMPETING 33
Table 6: Political Values of Fairness Regression Model
Dependent variable:
Rules of the Game Scale
Constant 30.512∗∗
(1.448)















Residual Std. Error 12.550 (df = 566)
F Statistic 8.506∗∗ (df = 6; 566)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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White men, compared to compared to White women and White men, did not significantly
differ in their support for breaking political values of fairness (β = 0.269, p = .882; β =
2.486, p = .364).
Overall, priming partisan competition does not appear to affect participants’ support
of political values of fairness and respect for rules. For all questions as a scale, there was
not a significant difference in responses between participants who received the partisan
competition prime and participants who received the non-competition prime. Although
there were significant effects of some covaraites on participants responses to the Rules of
the Game scale, none of these covaraites were experimentally manipulated nor the focus of
this present study. With these analyses, I am confident that priming partisan competition
does not directly reduce people’s support for political values of fairness and respect for
political rules.
Discussion
Based on the results of these analyses, I conclude that my hypotheses one and two
are supported by these data while hypothesis three is not supported by these data. Hypothesis
1 (people will tolerate election cheating more when it benefits their in-party, compared to
when it benefits the out-party) is supported by my election cheating regression contrast
analysis. When people are presented with situations in which their in-party would benefit
from election cheating, compared to when people are presented with situations in which
their out-party would benefit from election cheating, they are more tolerant of electoral
cheating.
Hypothesis 2a (when partisan competition is salient, compared to when partisan
competition is not salient, people will tolerate election cheating more when it benefits
their in-party and will tolerate electoral cheating less when it benefits their out-party) is
also supported by these data. Based on my election cheating regression contrast analysis,
when people are primed with partisan competition, compared to when primed with non-
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competition, they are more tolerant of election cheating when their in-party would benefit
from electoral cheating. Further, when people are primed with partisan competition, compared
to when primed with non-competition, they are less tolerant of election cheating when
their out-party would benefit from electoral cheating.
As hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2a are supported by these data, Hypothesis 2b (salient
partisan competition will magnify the difference in tolerance of election cheating when
the in-party benefits compared to when the out-party benefits) is also supported by these
data. As priming partisan competition caused people to become more tolerant of election
cheating when their in-party would benefit would electoral cheating and less tolerant of
election cheating when their out-party would benefit, there is a difference between people’s
tolerance of election cheating depending on which party benefits while primed with partisan
competition. This difference is also much larger than the same difference for people primed
with non-competition. With hypotheses one and two supported, this means my hypotheses
regarding election cheating were fully supported by these data and subsequent analysis.
However, hypothesis 3 (salient partisan competition will reduce support for political
values of fairness and respect for political rules) is not supported by these data. When
measuring people’s support for political values of fairness and respect for rules in general,
salient partisan competition did not change people’s support for these values. Although
people’s reported endorsement of political values of fairness consequential to democracy
did not change by priming of partisan competition, people’s differing responses to instances
of election cheating by salience of partisan competition indicate important consequences of
how salience of partisan competition affects people’s tolerance of political rule violations.
Overall, there are important implications we can conclude from this study and further
areas of investigation that future research can examine. Beginning with how salient partisan
competition affected tolerance of election cheating by which party benefits from cheating,
my finding that salient partisan competition increases people’s willingness to enforce electoral
rules when their out-party members benefit from rule breaking has important implications
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for both political behavior and political systems. It appears that when the electoral stakes
are low and people are unconcerned with election outcomes, people are willing to let election
transgressions by their out-party slide without severe consequences. But once partisan
competition is salient and an election appears to be neck-and-neck, this leniency goes away.
Instead, partisans are willing to use the letter of the law to deny votes and punish wrongdoing
by their opposing partisan group. This selective application of the rule of law, contrasted
with the general spirit of the law and further democratic values, clearly has consequences
and relevant parallels to examples in the U.S. elections and politics. Strict voter I.D. laws
give partisans the cover of “just enforcing the law” while denying or creating significant
obstacles to good-faith voting by out-party members. Similar instances regarding closing
or moving polling places to even using procedural political rules of institutions and agencies
to prevent a “win” by an out-party are within this same large-scale implications of this
finding.
Next, my finding that salient partisan competition increases people’s willingness to
tolerate breaking election rules when their in-party members benefit from rule breaking
has also important implications for both political behavior and political systems. While
partisans seem willing to “take the high road” and enforce rules that electorally harm
them in situations of low partisan competition, this relationship changes once partisans are
concerned about their party winning the election. While outside the scope of this present
study, the question of how far partisans are willing to go if they’re concerned out election
outcomes is one of grave importance. Even if many partisans are not willing to directly
engage in electoral cheating themselves, selective attitudinal outcomes are no less consequential.
Voters might be willing to forgive a co-partisan politician who engaged in electoral cheating
to win a close election whereas a co-partisan politician who engaged in the same behavior
would be held accountable for their actions if partisans felt safe they would retain their
say in government. Although, as an experimental study, this present research does not
describe the frequency or magnitude of these findings in the outside world, it is worth
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considering how these effects manifest beyond the scope of this controlled experiment.
As for exactly how and the extended to which partisan competition affects political
behavior in the natural world, these finding fit within conclusions of other research. High
levels of competition has been documented to make people less willing to help out-group
members and engage in cheating to help their in-group win competitive games (Hildreth et
al., 2016; Jackson & Esses, 2000). Although it is puzzling that salient partisan competition
does not affect peoples’ reported support for democratic values of fairness in general but
alters their specific responses to applications of these norms in specific, this finding is not
without parallel. One comparison that is of socially desirable responding to beliefs such
as racist attitudes (Krumpal, 2013). People may report they do not hold racist attitudes
as doing so is a violation of social norms, yet behave in ways that reveal their true beliefs
(Dovidio et al., 1997). This could be a similar instance in which people know the democratic
values that are socially desirable in yet act in ways counter to their socially desirable response
but expressive of their true attitude (Katz, 1960). Therefore, the results of this study appear
to be consistent findings from more generalized research.
The implications for how salient partisan competition increases people’s double standard
towards election cheating depend in part on the extent to which partisans express these
attitudes in the outside world. With a constant news cycle emphasizing the fierce contest
between Democrats and Republicans, there is little question that many American partisans
are exposed to information that increases the salience of partisan competition on a regular
basis. Although the specific election cheating questions used in this study put participants
in fictitious situations that many people will never experience in the outside world, the
same specific attitudes and judgments people use to reach a decision on these questions
likely apply to real-world political attitudes and situations. Potential analogous real-world
attitudes include not holding politicians of their own party accountable for engaging in
illegal or immoral activities while being overly sensitive to the same transgressions of the
opposing party, dismissing instances of voter fraud by their own political party as unimportant
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while harshly punishing even perceived illegal voting practices by their opposing party,
and accepting rushed conformations/appointments of judges/politicians of their own party
while being opposed to identical hasty proceedings by their opposing party. Further research
should explore the exact generalized effects of this study, but it is clear that salient partisan
competition’s effect on widening partisan double-standards on tolerance of ruling breaking
is likely consequential. As I will discuss next, how this study’s effects manifest in the real
world have important implications for democratic structure.
The differences between how partisans tolerate election cheating by different political
parties has the most potential consequence to democratic systems of government and how
democracies should be designed to foster democratic values among their citizens. Although
my finding that partisans tolerate election cheating differently depending on whether their
own political party or opposing political party benefits from election cheating should hardly
be surprising to scholars of modern American politics or even to regular consumers of
political news, the effect of salient partisan competition in widening this gap of people’s
tolerance of election cheating depending on who benefits warrants discussion.
These findings have troubling implications for American democracy and citizens’
democratic attitudes. A cornerstone of functioning democracy is citizen’s adherence to
political fair play and a respect for rules and procedures (McClosky,1964). While it is
not expected that all Americans fully endorse these democratic values, a certain level of
adherence among citizens is needed for democracy to function effectively (Griffith et al.,
1956). A significant double standard in people’s tolerance of election cheating violates
these fundamental democratic values referenced above. Therefore, as emphasizing political
competition causes this significant double standard in how partisans approach political
fair play and rules, there are democratic consequences of highly salient partisan elections.
As partisan competition itself causes people to be selectively adherent to political rules,
this is reason to re-evaluate the nominative good of democratic systems that place high
emphasis on competition or at least to acknowledge the negative consequences of these
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systems. As highly salient competitive elections reduce people’s support of fair play in
elections themselves, electoral systems that instead place value on other considerations
such as representation and participation may be needed for functional democracies (Rahat
et al., 2008).
The contrast of first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems and proportional representative
(PR) systems stand out in light of this research. In FPTP systems, such as the U.S., people
are encouraged to win elections because they lose out on all influence when they receive a
minority of the vote for a given election. This desire not to lose out on a zero-sum resource
of political representation and influence fits well within the desire to win elections by cheating
if necessary. However, the resource of political representation and influence is less zero-
sum in PR voting systems. While a narrowly losing an election in a PR system does not
award a party a majority influence, it still gives sizable representation and influence to
said political party and its supporters. This distinction seems to deemphasize partisan
competition to a certain degree as political parties, and therefore the citizens who support
them, do not have to “win” an election to receive a share of political resources and represen-
tation.
Yet another source of governmental structural that seems consequential to contributing
to high levels of partisan competition is the presence, or lack there of, of a coalition government
structure. By their very structure, coalition governments appear to encourage partisan
cooperation to a given extent. The uncertainty of which other political parties a partisan
could need to cooperative with in the future may reduce competitive attitudes partisans
hold towards other opposing political parties. While the exact differences in governmental
and democratic structure that affect citizens’ vigor of partisan competition are beyond
the scope of this present research, it seems clear a reduction of partisan competition is
desirable if citizens are expected to blanketly enforce political rules.
Given the evidence I have presented in this study that salient partisan competition
does increase partisan’s double-standard of tolerance toward political cheating, even if it
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does not reduce endorsement of democratic values themselves, political scientists should
examine possibility of salient partisan competition negatively affecting democratic systems
in other ways. McClosky (1964) concluded that political elites were a group that safeguarded
democracy because they supported these democratic values at disproportionately high
levels compared to the general population. As I only sampled a segment of the general
population, it is possible salient partisan competition changes tolerance toward political
cheating disproportionately in elites and therefore negatively affects democratic systems in
this way. If political elites care greatly about their reelection or the reelection of members
of their political party (Mayhew, 1974), then salient partisan competition could make
them willing to violate some political rules to increase their chance of election or reelection.
Other researchers could explore the full effect of salient partisan competition on the stability
of democratic systems.
Limitations
Social desirability bias has a longstanding and well established effect on survey responses
about sensitive questions (Kreuter, Presser, & Tourangeau, 2008; Krumpal, 2013). This
includes several topics of political research such as voting and racial attitudes where social
desirability bias has clear effects on people’s responses (McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Silver,
Anderson, & Abramson, 1986). With this in mind, it cannot be dismissed that social desirability
bias could have affected participants’ responses to several questions in this study. This is
especially possible with regards to the questions of interest about election cheating and
support for democratic values. Although this survey included techniques designed to reduce
socially desirable responding, such as restating the confidentiality of participant responses
and emphasizing the fictional nature of some questions, this was likely not enough to fully
eliminate the concern of socially desirable responding.
Also, despite this present study, as well as most research about the American population,
focusing on clear political partisans, I cannot simply dismiss the portion of the American
electorate that either does not identify with a political party or is politically disengaged.
PARTISAN CHEATING & COMPETING 41
In this study, I admittedly analyze data exclusively on self-identified partisans. This limits
the potential conclusions that can be reached from this study both because the context
of this study is specifically about the American political system and because it leaves no
room for non-partisans and the politically disengaged. Out-party and in-party status clearly
operates differently for non-partisans than it does for Democrats and Republicans, let
alone how these statuses affect interplay with salient competition between groups. Therefore,
I only draw conclusions from this study to clearly distinguished opposing partisan groups.
The lack of statistical power caused by low sample size when examining Democrats
and Republicans differing effects of salient partisan competition is also a severe limitation
of this study. Ideally, I would have enough resources to recruit a greater amount of partic-
ipants to increase statistical power and therefore increased confidence in the statistical
results when conducting my analyses by only Democratic participants and Republican
participants. I do not discuss the implications of my exploratory analyses by partisan
group in my discussion section due to this current lack of statistical confidence. Further
research should be conducted to examine how salient partisan competition affects Democrats’
and Republican’ tolerance of electoral cheating in different ways.
Conclusion
Overall, I find that salient partisan competition changes partisans’ tolerance of election
cheating depending on which political party benefits from cheating. When partisan competition
is made salient, people become more tolerant of election cheating when their in-party benefits
from cheating and less tolerant of election cheating when their out-party benefits from
cheating. Although the salience of partisan competition does not affect people’s endorsement
of democratic values of fairness and respect for rules, people’s differing tolerance of election
cheating has clear democratic implications. As this effect is generalizable to a wide context
of political rule breaking and possibly perceived political rule breaking, these results could
help explain at least a portion of why Democrats and Republicans treat each other so
differently. Taking this conclusion in the opposite direction, reducing political competition
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could be a way to solve, or at least reduce, partisan double-standards as well as partisan
cleavages and hostility more generally.
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Appendix
Appendix: Survey Questions
Electoral Cheating Question 1
Imagine that it’s just after a local election and one of your acquaintances, who is a registered
[Democrat/Republican], admits to you they voted twice in the election. If you reported
your acquaintance to an election official, their votes would not be counted, they would
have to pay a small fine, and they would not know you reported them.
How likely is it that you would report your acquaintance to an election official?
o Very likely (1)
o Likely (2)
o Slightly likely (3)
o Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
o Slightly unlikely (5)
o Unlikely (6)
o Very unlikely (7)
Electoral Cheating Question 2
Now, imagine a new scenario.
Imagine it’s a month away from the 2020 election. Michael Diaz, who is a [Democrat/Republican],
is running for county commissioner in your county, buys a local television advertisement
that will air in part of the county that is heavily [Republican/Democrat]. In this ad, he
deliberately misinforms Republican voters about the date of election day.
How likely would you be to vote for Michael Diaz ([D/R]) instead of the [Republican/Democrat]
candidate? o Very likely to vote for the Democrat (1)
o Likely to vote for the Democrat (2)
o Slightly likely to vote for the Democrat (3)
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o Wouldn’t vote for either candidate (4)
o Slightly likely to vote for the Republican (5)
o Likely to vote for the Republican (6)
o Very likely to vote for the Republican (7)
Electoral Cheating Question 3
Now, imagine a new scenario.
It’s the day after the 2020 election. A reliable Democratic county in your state is under
scrutiny for allowing people to vote past your state’s mandated poll closing time. Due to
voter demand, polling places in this Democratic county stayed open until midnight. State
law requires that polling places close at 8pm.
Should votes cast after 8pm be counted?
o Definitely should be counted (1)
o Should be counted (2)
o Probably should be counted (3)
o Uncertain (4)
o Probably should be NOT counted (5)
o Should be NOT counted (6)
o Definitely should be NOT counted (7)
Electoral Cheating Question 4
Now, imagine a new scenario.
Imagine you’re employed to work at your local polling place on election day 2020. You are
required to check voters’ state-issued ID to ensure they’re eligible vote. An acquaintance
who you know is a registered Democrat, comes to vote and presents their registration card
but is unable to present an appropriate from of ID. Under state law, your acquaintance
would not be allowed to cast a ballot without appropriate ID.
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In this situation, how likely are you to allow your acquaintance to vote?
o Very likely (1)
o Likely (2)
o Slightly likely (3)
o Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
o Slightly unlikely (5)
o Unlikely (6)
o Very unlikely (7)
Electoral Cheating Question 5
Now, imagine a new scenario.
Imagine that it’s the day before the 2020 election. You intend to vote, but realize that
you have lost your voter ID, and will not be able to vote without it. You mention this to
your friend, who is a registered independent, and your friend offers to let you use his voter
ID. In your state, only a voter ID is required to vote and you will not need to present any
photo identification to vote.
How likely is it that you would go vote by using your friend’s voter ID?
o Very likely (1)
o Likely (2)
o Slightly likely (3)
o Neither likely nor unlikely (4)
o Slightly unlikely (5)
o Unlikely (6)
o Very unlikely (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 1
There are times when it almost seems better for the people to take the law into their own
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hands rather than wait for the machinery of government to act.
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 2
The majority has the right to abolish the minorities if it wants to.
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 3
We might as well make up or minds that in order to make the world better a lot of innocent
people will have to suffer.
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
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o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 4
If congressional committees stuck strictly to the rules and gave every witness his rights,
they would never succeed in exposing the many dangerous subversives they have turned
up.
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 5
I don’t mind a politician’s methods if he manages to get the right things done.
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 6
Almost any unfairness or brutality may have to be justified when some great purpose is
PARTISAN CHEATING & COMPETING 54
being carried out.
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 7
Politicians have to cut a few corners if they are going to get anywhere.
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 8
People ought to be allowed to vote even if they can’t do so intelligently.
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
o Agree (6)
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o Strongly agree (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 9
To bring about great changes for the benefit of mankind often requires cruelty and even
ruthlessness.
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 10
Very few politicians have clean records, so why get excited about the mudslinging that
sometimes goes on?
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 11
It is all right to get around the law if you don’t actually break it.
o Strongly disagree (1)
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o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)
Rules of the Game Questions 12
The true American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to
save it.
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Slightly disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Slightly agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)
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Appendix: Simulated News Article Primes
Figure 3: Partisan Competition Prime for Democrats
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Figure 4: Partisan Competition Prime for Republicans
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Figure 5: Non-competition Prime for Democrats
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Figure 6: Non-competition Prime for Republicans
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Appendix: Analyses
Table 7: Conbach’s Alpha Scores for all Five Election Cheating In-party Target Questions
Non-Competition Prime Partisan Competition Prime
Item Statistics: Reliability if Dropped: Item Statistics: Reliability if Dropped:
Raw α Standardized α Raw α Standardized α Raw α Standardized α Raw α test
EC1 0.58 0.59 0.22 0.27 0.41 0.41 0.05 0.09
EC2 0.63 0.65 0.15 0.20 0.42 0.49 -0.05 -0.02
EC3 0.22 0.16 0.61 0.61 0.13 0.07 0.43 0.42
EC4 0.64 0.66 0.15 0.19 0.66 0.66 -0.39 -0.35
EC5 0.61 0.61 0.21 0.25 0.65 0.64 -0.38 -0.31
Raw α 0.35 0.01
Standardized α 0.39 0.04
Observations 128 153
Table 8: Conbach’s Alpha Scores for all Five Election Cheating Out-party Target
Questions
Non-Competition Prime Partisan Competition Prime
Item Statistics: Reliability if Dropped: Item Statistics: Reliability if Dropped:
Raw α Standardized α Raw α Standardized α Raw α Standardized α Raw α test
EC1 0.47 0.46 -0.08 0.01 0.60 0.59 -0.38 0.31
EC2 0.41 0.52 -0.16 -0.10 0.23 0.34 0.07 0.12
EC3 0.20 0.13 0.38 0.37 0.28 0.18 0.31 0.29
EC4 0.55 0.56 -0.24 -0.17 0.50 0.52 -0.16 -0.16
EC5 0.61 0.58 -0.33 -0.20 0.58 0.58 -0.30 -0.27
Raw α -0.05 -0.06
Standardized α -0.02 -0.03
Observations 149 162
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Table 9: Electoral Cheating Regression Model by Partisanship
Dependent variable: Electoral Cheating Scale
Democratic Participants Only Republican Participants Only
Constant 7.840∗∗ 7.434∗∗
(0.550) (0.588)
Partisan Competition Prime 2.301∗∗ 0.198
(0.754) (0.785)
Out-Party Benefit from Cheating −1.958∗∗ −2.416∗∗
(0.739) (0.821)
Partisan Competition Prime* −2.950∗∗ −1.572
Out-Party Benefit from Cheating (1.037) (1.088)
Observations 339 253
R2 0.142 0.142
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.132
Residual Std. Error 4.760 (df = 335) 4.283 (df = 249)
F Statistic 18.450∗∗ (df = 3; 355) 13.758∗∗ (df = 3; 249)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix: Visualizations
Figure 7: Effect of Priming Competition & Group Target on Tolerance of Election
Cheating (Full Model)
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